

Holding Up a Mirror to the State

What the UK Government's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Annual Report 2020/21 Reveals About the COVID Era

A Public Information Briefing

Author's Note

Initially, I want to express my thanks to the individual who brought the subject report to my attention.

Very often, it has been the vigilance of such individuals which has assisted our investigation into COVID-era issues and for that, I remain always appreciative.

Introduction

History is often written twice.

The first version appears in newspaper headlines, ministerial statements and television broadcasts.

The second emerges years later, within official reports, committee papers, annual reviews and internal documents

that quietly describe what government itself believed it was doing.

This paper concerns one such document.

The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) Annual Report 2020/21 received relatively little public attention. Yet, when read carefully, it reveals much about how the United Kingdom viewed the COVID-19 period.

Most members of the public understandably regarded COVID principally as a public health emergency.

The report demonstrates something considerably broader.

It presents COVID as engaging national security, strategic communications, international resilience, counter-disinformation activity and integrated cross-government working.

The purpose of this briefing is simply to assist members of the public in understanding what the Government itself considered important during one of the most significant periods in modern British history.

Chapter One - COVID Was Viewed as More Than a Health Crisis

One of the first observations from the report is that COVID is repeatedly discussed within a much wider strategic context.

Rather than being described solely as a medical emergency, the report associates the pandemic with matters including:

- national security;
- international stability;
- resilience;
- hostile state activity;
- governance;
- economic stability;
- strategic competition;
- institutional capability.

The significance of this cannot be overstated.

Many citizens understandably viewed COVID through the lens of hospitals, vaccines and public health advice.

Government, however, was simultaneously considering the pandemic through the lens of national security and strategic governance.

Whether one agrees with that approach or not, it is important to appreciate that this broader perspective existed.

Chapter Two - Strategic Communications Became a Government Capability

Perhaps the most striking feature of the report is its repeated emphasis upon communication.

Communication is not discussed merely as the provision of public information.

Instead, terms repeatedly appear such as:

- strategic communications;
- behavioural messaging;
- resilience;
- influence;
- countering narratives;
- public awareness;
- coordinated communications.

The report therefore illustrates that communication itself became an operational capability.

That does not necessarily imply anything improper. Governments have always sought to communicate effectively during crises.

However, it does demonstrate that communication was regarded as a strategic function extending well beyond routine public information.

For many readers, this may be the first indication that the Government itself viewed communication as part of its broader national resilience strategy.

Chapter Three - Misinformation and Disinformation

The report devotes considerable attention to misinformation and disinformation.

It describes programmes intended to:

- identify misinformation;
- monitor disinformation;
- improve understanding of information threats;
- strengthen resilience;
- support coordinated responses;
- address vaccine-related communications.

No reasonable person would dispute that false information can present genuine difficulties during national emergencies.

Equally, however, these sections naturally give rise to legitimate constitutional questions.

- ***Who determines what constitutes misinformation?***
- ***How should competing scientific views be distinguished from deliberate falsehood?***
- ***What safeguards ensure that efforts to counter misinformation do not inadvertently discourage legitimate public discussion?***

These are questions for democratic society as a whole.

They are neither anti-government nor anti-science.

They concern transparency, accountability and public confidence.

Chapter Four - Integrated Government

Another recurring theme throughout the report is integration.

The report repeatedly describes cooperation across multiple departments and agencies.

Rather than acting independently, government increasingly presents itself as operating through integrated structures bringing together expertise from numerous disciplines.

Those disciplines include diplomacy, security, communications, development, governance and law enforcement support.

For readers unfamiliar with modern government, this represents an important insight.

Government increasingly understands complex problems as requiring coordinated rather than isolated responses.

That may improve effectiveness. It also increases the importance of accountability, because responsibilities can become less obvious to the public.

Chapter Five - Why This Matters

The purpose of this paper is to encourage informed citizenship.

- The more integrated government becomes, the greater the importance of transparency.
- The broader strategic communications become, the greater the importance of public confidence.
- The more institutions cooperate behind the scenes, the greater the need for democratic scrutiny.

These principles should not be viewed as obstacles to effective government, as they are among the foundations upon which effective government ultimately depends.

Public confidence is strengthened not through secrecy, but through openness.

Conclusion - Read the Document for Yourself

One of the most valuable habits within any democracy is reading primary source material.

Official reports frequently reveal far more about governmental thinking than headlines ever can.

The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Annual Report 2020/21 is one such document.

Whether readers ultimately agree with its priorities is entirely a matter for them.

What matters is that those priorities become understood.

Only an informed public can engage meaningfully in constitutional debate.

The purpose of this briefing has therefore been simple - To hold up a mirror to the State, not through opinion, speculation or rhetoric, but through the Government's own published words.

The Report itself is annexed below.

Ian Clayton

5 August 2026

Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2020/21



Cover:

Top Left: RAF Chinook helicopter lifting a French Army Panhard all-terrain vehicle as part of UK support to the UN operation in Mali. Credit: Provided by the Ministry of Defence, UK MOD © Crown copyright 2021

Top Right: An ancestral medicine house of the Awá Tortugaña indigenous community in Nariño, Colombia. The community is supported by the UK-funded United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Peace as part of the transitional justice work related to human rights violations during the Colombian civil war. Credit: www.fondonuol.org/tragaluz.video

Bottom Left: The Somali National army and Government Officials hold in a reconciliation meeting in territory recently reclaimed from al-Shabaab. The CSSF –funded Early Recovery Initiative project facilitated a series of reconciliation and peace talks to forestall inter-clan conflict and improve community cohesion. Credit: Photo provided by the Early Recovery Initiative

Bottom Right: Syrian girls attending a CSSF-funded project in Gaziantep, Turkey that supports access to education. Credit: Bilkent University Project Team (the implementing partner).

Contents

Foreword by the Paymaster General.....	4
Introduction	5
CSSF Allocation for 2020/21	5
Global reach of CSSF Country and Regional Programmes.....	6
CSSF Contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals.....	7
CSSF COVID-19 Response	8
Supporting the International Health Response.....	8
Tackling Disinformation	8
Violence against Women.....	9
Conflict and Instability.....	11
State Threats	12
Transnational Threats	13
Serious and Organised Crime	13
Counter Terrorism	13
Women, Peace and Security.....	14
New Portfolios and Thematic Focuses	16
Cyber.....	16
Climate and Biodiversity	16
CSSF Governance.....	18
Measuring success in 2020/21.....	18
Non-Discretionary Funding and the Rapid Response Mechanism	18
Preparing for the future	19
Annex A: CSSF Financial Spend 2020/21	20
Annex B: CSSF non-discretionary spend breakdown	23
Annex C: CSSF Governance—Additional Information	24
Budget allocations	24
Programme design, delivery and oversight.....	24
Working in high-risk environments.....	25

Foreword by the Paymaster General

I am delighted, as lead Minister for the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), to share with you the Fund's Annual Report covering financial year 2020/21.

This was a challenging year for CSSF teams and partners, with the global COVID-19 pandemic heavily affecting some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions. The CSSF's agility enabled it to play a leading part in the UK's response to conflict, stability and security challenges overseas in a rapidly evolving context.

The Fund moved quickly to support the UK Government's response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The speed and scale of the CSSF's contribution underlined the continuing value of the core principles that underpin the Fund—an integrated, agile and catalytic approach, with high-risk appetite.

For 2020/21, the Fund adopted four new high-level outcomes relating to conflict and stability; transnational threats; state threats; and women, peace and security. These provided a renewed focus for the Fund and helped ensure strategic coherence across the CSSF.

In 2020/21, the Fund also addressed the emerging national security challenges, which were subsequently reflected in the UK Government's Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published in March 2021¹. These include the growth of state-based threats, instability and strategic competition, and climate change.

For example, in Ukraine, the CSSF enabled an integrated approach, drawing together different UK Government departments across defence, security, diplomacy and development to support Ukraine in countering the full range of Russian hybrid threats, including propaganda and disinformation. In Colombia, CSSF projects on countering environmental crime leveraged funding from the Colombian national budget and the UK's International Climate Fund. In Somalia, the Fund's high-risk appetite enabled the UK to be the only donor working directly with the Somalia National Army and the African Union Mission in Somalia to enhance civil-military coordination and to improve community reconciliation in areas of Somalia recently recovered from al-Shabaab occupation.



The Rt Hon Michael Ellis QC MP

The CSSF provided critical support overseas during the pandemic. In the British Overseas Territories, existing CSSF programming was realigned to provide key COVID-19 testing equipment and to enable a comprehensive vaccination programme, helping to keep the populations of the Territories safe. The CSSF-funded Counter-Daesh Communications Cell used its digital communications platforms to counter Daesh propaganda claiming that the virus was a “soldier of Allah”, and thwarted Daesh attempts to use the pandemic to promote their ideology. In Moldova, the CSSF continued to support survivors of domestic and gender-based violence against the backdrop of a rise in incidents linked to restrictions on movement and the economic downturn caused by COVID-19.

The CSSF has not been immune to the resource pressures across government, caused by the severe impact of the pandemic on the UK economy. This was reflected in the Fund's allocation for the financial year 2021/22. This year's Spending Review, however, strongly endorsed the continuing importance of a cross-Whitehall programme fund with the ability to blend ODA and non-ODA, and to ensure a fully integrated cross-government approach to tackling instability. Continued improvements on monitoring, evaluation and learning, alongside the adaptation of fund outcomes to reflect the priorities identified by the Integrated Review, will allow the Fund to focus resources on those countries, regions and thematic issues where it can have the greatest impact.

¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy>

Introduction

Since 2015, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) has enabled a cross- government approach to prevent conflicts and tackle threats to UK interests arising from instability overseas. Using both ODA and non-ODA funding, the CSSF brings together the UK's diplomatic, development, military and security capabilities to support delivery of the UK's Government's top national security priorities.

The CSSF is designed to be:

- **Integrated:** utilising expertise from across government departments and agencies;
- **Catalytic:** mobilising smaller-scale activities with a view to upscaling, providing the foundation and evidence base for longer-term programming;
- **High risk:** allowing CSSF programming to act in unstable or uncertain environments, and working as a test bed to address rapidly evolving challenges, and
- **Agile:** responsive to the changing circumstances. These principles allow the Fund to conduct rapid analysis and to develop new capabilities and programmatic interventions to address complex security threats, as well as work with allies and multilaterals in our efforts to maintain global security.

In 2020/21, the CSSF spent a total of £1,260.2 million. Of this, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding constituted £610.3 million (48.4% of spend); and non-ODA £649.9 million (51.6%). CSSF funding was spent by 14 government departments and agencies, with other non-spending departments providing expertise. The FCDO (established on 2 September 2020 with the merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development) was the largest CSSF spending department (£926.9 million), with the Ministry of Defence (£238.4 million) and Home Office (£34.1 million) as the next two largest spending departments.

The CSSF responded to the challenges of COVID-19. The global CSSF network adapted to the constraints of working during the pandemic while continuing to meet programme management requirements. CSSF programmes pivoted to support the immediate international response to the virus and also responded

to the changing threats to national security such as the increase in COVID-19 related disinformation.

The Fund's commitment to monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) continued in 2020/21, with significant progress towards building a fund-level MEL system suited to the contexts in which the Fund operates, capturing evidence and learning against four thematic fund-level outcomes—conflict and stability, transnational threats, state threats and women, peace and security. The Joint Funds Unit appointed a new climate adviser and a cyber adviser to work with policy and programme colleagues on these two emerging UK Government thematic priorities.

CSSF Allocation for 2020/21

In Financial Year 2020/21, the CSSF had an initial budget allocation of £1.366 billion of which £685.83 million (50.21%) was ODA and £680.22 million (49.79%) was non-ODA. The National Security Council approved regional and thematic portfolio allocations based on a set of criteria including strategic need, as well as value for money and past performance. The portfolio-level allocations were presented to Parliament by Written Ministerial Statement on 28 January 2021².

Given the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the UK's economy, the Foreign Secretary led a cross-government review of the ODA budget in August 2020 to ensure that the UK would meet, but not exceed, the commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on ODA in 2020. Alongside all ODA-spending UK Government departments, the JFU oversaw an ODA re-prioritisation exercise to identify changes to the CSSF's ODA budget.

Further information on CSSF spend, governance and budget allocation is contained in annexes A-C.

2 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-01-28/debates/21012813000009/ConflictStabilityAndSecurityFundAllocations2020-21>

Global reach of CSSF Country and Regional Programmes

Americas

- Colombia
- Panama
- Peru
- Jamaica

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

- Azerbaijan
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Tajikistan
- Uzbekistan
- Belarus
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Russia
- Ukraine
- Armenia
- Moldova

Western Balkans

- Albania
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Kosovo
- North Macedonia
- Montenegro
- Serbia

South Asia and Afghanistan

- Afghanistan
- Maldives
- Pakistan
- Sri Lanka

Europe

- Turkey

Middle East North Africa

- Syria
- Iraq
- Morocco
- Algeria
- Egypt
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Occupied Palestinian Territories/Israel
- Tunisia
- Yemen
- Iran

Overseas Territories

- Anguilla
- St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha
- Bermuda
- Cayman Islands
- Falkland Islands
- Gibraltar
- Montserrat
- Turks and Caicos Islands
- British Virgin Islands
- Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia
- Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands
- South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
- British Indian Ocean Territory
- British Antarctic Territory

Multilateral Organisations funded by CSSF

- United Nations (UN)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- World Bank

Africa

- Ethiopia
- Kenya
- Senegal
- Cameroon
- Chad
- Nigeria
- Somalia
- Burkina Faso
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Niger
- Mozambique
- Tanzania
- Uganda
- Ghana
- Central African Republic
- Sudan
- South Sudan
- Ivory Coast
- Zimbabwe

Asia Pacific

- Myanmar
- Fiji
- Kiribati
- Papua New Guinea
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- Philippines
- Malaysia
- Indonesia
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu
- Philippines
- Malaysia
- Indonesia


CSSF Contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals

In FY 2020/21, the CSSF continued to support the delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Fund primarily supported:

- **Goal 16:** To promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies
- **Goal 5:** Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

The CSSF also supports the delivery of other SDGs, notably:

- **Goal 1:** End poverty in all its forms everywhere
- **Goal 8:** Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all
- **Goal 9:** Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries.
- **Goal 10:** Reduce inequality within and among countries
- **Goal 11:** Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
- **Goal 13:** Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
- **Goal 14:** Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
- **Goal 17:** Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development



SDG Breakdown by Portfolio

Portfolio	SDGs
Africa	1, 5, 6, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17
Americas	5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17
Asia Pacific	5, 16
Counter Terrorism Programme Fund	16
Cyber	5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17
Eastern Europe, Central Asia	1, 5, 8, 10, 13, 16, 17
Gender and Human Rights	5, 10, 16
Middle East & North Africa	5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16
Migration	3, 10
Multilateral Strategy	16
Overseas Territories	3, 5, 7, 13, 16, 17
South Asia	5, 16
Serious Organised Crime	5, 8, 16
Western Balkans	3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16

CSSF COVID-19 Response

The CSSF's ability to provide innovative, agile and integrated solutions to respond to complex global issues enabled the Fund to make a valuable contribution to the UK's international COVID-19 response. Sitting at the heart of government, the CSSF played an integral role in delivering programme activity that complemented the work of UK Government departments in response to the pandemic internationally.

Supporting the International Health Response

CSSF programmes pivoted to support governments worldwide and the British Overseas Territories with their immediate response to the pandemic. This included facilitating the delivery of life-saving medical supplies to the poorest and most vulnerable in conflict-affected and fragile states and supporting efforts to tackle the spread of infection.

Rapid CSSF funding significantly decreased the rate of transmission of COVID-19 in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon by improving sanitary conditions, promoting proper hygiene, and raising public awareness about the seriousness of the threat. Palestinian Civil Defence (PCD) teams focused on disinfecting highly frequented public locations such as clinics, pharmacies, local NGOs, and mosques. In around two weeks, PCD teams disinfected over 5,000 locations across all twelve camps. The effort involved 200 permanent volunteers and 250 additional volunteers recruited to support, 26% of whom were women. PCD distributed cleaning and disinfectant products to the poorest households in the camps, which ensured that simple hygiene products and prevention tools were available to the most vulnerable residents.

At the start of the pandemic in March 2020, Pakistan had the ability to carry out only 950 COVID-19 PCR tests a day. In response to an urgent request from the Government of Pakistan, CSSF funding supported the Punjab Forensics Science Agency (PFSA) to pivot its CSSF-supported DNA testing capacity to COVID-19 testing. The project provided PFSA with two DNA automation machines, which more than doubled its testing capacity to nearly 14,000 tests per week, making it Pakistan's fifth largest testing capacity. PFSA provided testing for the Tableeghi Ijtimaa—one of the world's largest Islamic religious

gatherings, allowing foreign nationals to travel back to their countries. PFSA's experience in responding to COVID-19 has since improved its response to other events. For example, in May 2020, PFSA DNA analysis enabled the identification of victims of the Pakistan International Airways plane crash outside Karachi within 36 hours, and in October 2020 to identify the perpetrator of a high-profile rape case within eight hours of receiving the evidence.

The CSSF Overseas Territories portfolio rapidly reallocated £15 million from existing programming to establish a COVID-19 programme that allowed the UK to help protect the British Overseas Territories. The programme supported the supply of personal protective equipment, testing machines, test kits, lab supplies, ventilators, isolation facilities, and qualified medical personnel across the Territories. This enabled seven Territories to establish COVID-19 testing facilities and others to continue testing when supply lines were cut due to lockdowns. Attention then turned to the provision of vaccines and, since January 2021, the programme arranged for vaccines to be delivered to all British Overseas Territories, including the most remote, Tristan da Cunha, Pitcairn and to scientific staff in the British Antarctic Territory. This has so far led to the full vaccination of over 80% of the adult populations of the British Overseas Territories.

Tackling Disinformation

During the pandemic, the spread of false information and conspiracy theories about COVID-19 was aimed at undermining the international response against the virus. False information ranged from questioning the threat from the disease, promoting dangerous 'cures' and questioning the vaccine. CSSF programmes adapted to build public resilience against disinformation.

The CSSF's Countering Disinformation and Media Development Programme adapted to identify and counter COVID-19 related disinformation sponsored by hostile states and malign actors. The programme's media monitoring capability tracked and reported COVID-19 related disinformation. This capability contributed significantly to the UK's understanding of disinformation operations related to the pandemic and the vaccine's development and roll-out, helping to identify where and how the UK could best counter this disinformation. It also facilitated better coordination



The UK Governor of Monserrat inspects CSSF-funded delivery of the COVID-19 vaccine.

between UK Government departments and agencies and the wider international community to support efforts to address vaccine hesitancy.

The CSSF-funded Counter Daesh Communications Cell (CDCC) runs digital platforms that reach 100,000s of people in Iraq and Syria. In 2020/21, the CDCC adapted its Global Coalition public communications work to support the regional response to COVID-19, including countering Daesh attempts to use the pandemic to promote their ideology. Daesh propaganda claimed the virus was a “soldier of Allah,” and attempted to exploit overstretched government services to reassert itself in liberated areas. In response, the CDCC identified and shared stories of community-level initiatives to manage the pandemic, and of social solidarity cutting across ethnic and religious lines. The CDCC’s digital channels were also used to promote crucial public health advice and support from international organisations operating in the region, including the World Health Organisation. While Daesh sought to benefit from COVID-19 by accentuating social division and encouraging its networks to attack government targets, it failed to make ground with this narrative and within months, ceased discussing the issue in its propaganda.

Violence against Women

Since the outbreak of the pandemic, all types of violence against women, particularly domestic violence, have increased, as outlined by UN Women in their publication, *The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19*.³ This development highlighted the importance of the UK Government’s commitment to gender equality, as COVID-19 posed new risks and exacerbated existing harms for women



In Moldova, CSSF funds training for Transnistrian law enforcement officers on how to identify and effectively respond to GBV cases. Credit: Center “Resonance”

and girls, particularly in areas of conflict where women are already disproportionately affected. Through the Gender and Human Rights portfolio, the CSSF funded the Gender Action for Peace and Security’s (GAPS) project *Now and the Future: Gender Equality, Peace and Security in a COVID-19 World*. Working with 22 partners across ten countries, GAPS undertook rapid primary research to understand the short and long-term implications of COVID-19 on gender equality and conflict dynamics worldwide, helping the UK and other donors understand how to target future programming.

In Moldova, the CSSF continued to support survivors of domestic and gender-based violence (GBV). Against the backdrop of a rise in incidents linked to restrictions on movement and the economic downturn caused by COVID-19, CSSF programmes supported affected women in Moldova. This included the provision of GBV training for police in the autonomous region of Transnistria. Through the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the CSSF also enabled the only shelter for survivors of domestic violence in Transnistria to remain open throughout the pandemic, which provided a lifeline for vulnerable women. The IOM also provided personal protective equipment, cleaning and disinfectant products.

During 2020, a CSSF-funded Government Communication Service International project was adapted to support the Montenegrin Government’s communications response to COVID-19. This sought to address an estimated 30% increase in violence against women and domestic abuse in Montenegro. A campaign, aimed at providing women with information on where they could access help, was launched and reached some 12% of the population, more than

3 <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19>

70,000 people. Meanwhile, support to the shelters for survivors of domestic and gender-based violence was also increased, which enabled the provision of 24/7 online counselling and legal aid services, allowing more than 100 women to access support during lockdowns.

Conflict and Instability

Conflict and instability overseas directly impact the UK's national security, allowing terrorism and organised crime to spread, undermining the open and resilient international order that the UK is committed to building. The CSSF seeks to address these issues by preventing conflict, reducing violence and helping states transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace. This is essential to the UK's future security and prosperity.

Through the CSSF, the UK is supporting the UN in improving peacekeeping operations. CSSF funding has supported the development of the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) that allows peacekeeping missions to systematically assess their operating environment and use data and analysis to evaluate progress towards their goals. This enables UN leadership to make evidence-based decisions in delivery of their mandate to de-escalate conflicts and improve security in some of the world's most fragile countries. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), for example, used CPAS to support the evaluation of their operations around the elections in 2020/21. MINUSCA learned lessons from this evaluation that enabled them to implement strategic and operational adjustments for the third round of legislative elections, including reducing the exposure of polling stations to possible attack. CPAS data later revealed an 84% decrease in human rights violations and a 36% increase in the number of polling stations that remained open during the December 2020 and March 2021 elections. This experience will help guide the Mission's support to the next local elections in 2022/23.

The UK is the only donor working directly with the Somalia National Army (SNA) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), using CSSF funding to enhance civil-military coordination and improve community reconciliation and cohesion in areas of Somalia recently recovered from al-Shabaab occupation. In 2020, the CSSF funded the Early Recovery Initiative, a project where community-based liaison officers and on the ground stabilisation work created the space for the Federal Government of Somalia to deliver services in communities in Lower Shabelle, recovered from al Shabab during Operation Badbaado. This included supporting state-level

governments to lead community consultations and to select interim local leaders. The CSSF also enabled the SNA and AMISOM to directly provide immediate resources (such as food and medicines) to these communities whilst local service delivery infrastructure was out of action. Evaluations of the project concluded that these initiatives improved community confidence and trust in security forces and state government. The Early Recovery Initiative's catalytic role as a 'first responder' enabled the work of other donors and contributed considerably to the success of Operation Badbaado, under which all the recovered areas have remained in government control.

A surge of demolitions of Palestinian structures and Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, is in violation of international law in all but the most exceptional circumstances and is undermining stability and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution. Alongside the EU, France, other states and international aid agencies, the UK oversees and co-funds the West Bank Protection Consortium through the CSSF. The Consortium seeks to uphold international law by empowering communities, protecting the most vulnerable and leveraging the diplomatic influence of donors to address the root causes of the conflict. In 2020, the Consortium supported over 50,000 Palestinians including Bedouin communities, facing demolition or eviction in the West Bank including East Jerusalem to remain on their land through the provision of emergency relief, infrastructure, access to water, and legal support. For example, in 2021 multiple mass demolitions in one community in the Jordan Valley left 63 people homeless, without water and medical assistance. The Consortium provided shelters, water tanks and legal aid, and called for urgent humanitarian access to the community and an immediate halt to further demolitions.

State Threats

The nature of state threats is changing, growing increasingly complex and threatening security, democracy and the stability of the international order. The UK Government is committed to improving resilience to threats from state actors, strengthening our national security and that of our international partners, and pre-empting new international threats. Through the CSSF, the UK is promoting open societies and economies, while working towards regional and global stability.

In 2020-21, CSSF programmes were focused on bringing about changes in the following areas:

- *Improving vulnerable groups' resilience to state threats.* In Lithuania, the CSSF-funded Strong in Diversity programme brought together young people from Lithuanian and Russian backgrounds, teaching them how to participate in democratic processes, give back to their communities and in turn create meaningful collaboration between ethnic groups in the country. This helped to counter stereotypes created by fake news and populist agendas, and improved social cohesion in the face of divisive narratives.
- *Strengthening partner governments' capabilities.* Training modules created under the CSSF-funded National Security Communications Team (NSCT) programme enabled the Government of Colombia to deploy a more effective strategic communication response to counter disinformation from hostile state actors.
- *UK resilience to state threats.* The NSCT launched a campaign to increase awareness of the issue of disinformation amongst the UK population and drive behaviour change. Evaluation of the campaign showed that there has been a positive change of behaviour in the following areas: checking whether an on-line post comes from a trustworthy source, stopping to think if it sounds credible, and fact checking stories before amplifying them.

The UK plays a central role in the international community's support for Ukrainian efforts to stand up to Russian aggression and build strong, democratic institutions that open up opportunities for trade and partnership. Through the CSSF, UK Government departments co-ordinate their work to support Ukraine in countering the full range of

Russian hybrid threats, including propaganda and disinformation. The CSSF supports several projects to counter disinformation threats, including developing government capability in partnership with NATO; and programmes in Ukraine that encourage people of all ages to be critical thinkers when consuming media, particularly those living in communities vulnerable to divisive narratives that undermine stability. In addition the CSSF funds the Digital Forensic Research Lab project, which has developed a network of 'Digital Sherlocks', researchers conducting online open-source investigations of Russian activity and tracking Russian violations of the 2014 Minsk Protocol ceasefire agreement.

The CSSF is working with the Ukrainian authorities on a broad range of security-related issues, including defence and security sector reform and enhancing governance. CSSF funding supports a UK Special Defence Adviser attached to the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, who has led work on anti-corruption, state defence industry reform and strengthened civilian democratic oversight of the military. The CSSF supports the Ukrainian military through a British military-led mission (Operation ORBITAL) to train the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This mission focuses primarily on developing military capacity across the Ukrainian Army, Navy and Air Force in operational planning, training of junior leaders, infantry training and specialist courses which include logistics, maritime and air operations. The programme has so far trained over 19,000 personnel, enhancing the resilience of the Ukrainian Army. Overall, CSSF support has significantly improved Ukraine's ability to defend itself from external aggression, strengthened bilateral ties and helped reassure the Ukrainian Government of the UK's enduring commitment to its security and sovereignty.

Transnational Threats

Threats to the UK's national security take many forms, including transnational threats such as terrorism, serious and organised crime and illicit financing, particularly where it supports hostile state activity. The CSSF adopts an integrated approach to understand and counter these threats using the skills and expertise from different UK Government departments and international partners.

Serious and Organised Crime

Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) affects more UK citizens, more often, than any other national security threat and leads to more deaths in the UK each year than all other national security threats combined. SOC groups operating across multiple jurisdictions have substantial impacts internationally. Crime committed abroad can, and does, affect those living in the UK, both directly by affecting livelihoods and harming prosperity, but also indirectly due to the impact on communities from crimes such as human, guns and narcotics trafficking. The UK, through the CSSF, works with partner governments to combat SOC and pursue such groups.

The British Virgin Islands' (BVI) porous borders and position along one of the main trafficking routes from South America to the USA leaves BVI vulnerable to illicit activities, primarily drugs and firearms trafficking. BVI is a British Overseas Territory, and the UK is constitutionally responsible for internal security, external affairs, defence and good governance. The CSSF Border Security Programme delivers interventions to tackle organised crime gangs, drugs and human trafficking, and cyber-crime. Through the CSSF, the Ministry of Defence has provided capacity building support to the Royal Virgin Island Police Force (RVIPF) to strengthen their response to SOC threats. This included maritime training for the RVIPF Marine Unit, to improve their seamanship skills and ability to combat maritime narcotics smuggling. Alongside other activities their improvement in capability has contributed to an increase in drug seizures by the RVIPF. This includes a record seizure of 2,353 kg of cocaine in November 2020 with a street value of approximately £189 million. In 2021, there have been three further seizures amounting to more than 1,300 kg.

Counter Terrorism

Kenya is a popular destination for UK tourists, as well as being a permanent home to large numbers of UK citizens. Regional extremist groups such as Al Shabaab have shown both the intent and capability to attack western targets. The UK is committed to assisting the Kenyan government in building their capacity to identify, arrest and prosecute suspected terrorists. The Kahawa Law Courts, Kenya's first court dedicated to handling terrorism offences, opened in December 2020 with the first terrorism case appearing in February 2021. The establishment of this court, funded jointly by the US and UK through CSSF, is one of a range of UK-supported initiatives that contribute to improving prosecution of terrorists in a timely and effective manner, in line with international human rights standards.

CSSF-funded projects under the International Prevent Programme have supported partner countries to develop the capacity to identify, support and safeguard individuals who are at risk of radicalisation and recruitment leading to terrorism. In 2020, over 100 practitioners were trained to deliver early interventions in countries across Africa and the Middle East where the risk to UK tourists, residents and overseas workers is high. In one project the UK supported the development of an early intervention warning system to identify and refer individuals at risk to multi-agency intervention panels, which provide counselling, faith guidance and personal and vocational skills development. The partner government has now adopted the system as national policy. If our partners can effectively prevent individuals being radicalised overseas, it reduces the risk of successful terrorist attacks which could target UK nationals both at home and abroad.

Women, Peace and Security

Gender inequality remains the most pervasive and deep-set form of inequality and injustice globally, and can perpetuate and exacerbate conflict, instability and insecurity. The UK Government's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda recognises that achieving gender equality and protecting women's rights are imperative to all other peace and security objectives. CSSF programmes are underpinned by the principle that work to prevent conflict, violence and insecurity must equitably benefit all members of society. The CSSF is committed to protecting and promoting women and ensuring that decision-making processes and leadership at all levels are inclusive of the societies these processes represent.

In Syria, the CSSF-funded Feminist Movement for Change project has broadened the scope for Syrian women to make their voices heard in the ongoing conflict. The project has unblocked key barriers to the survival of women-led civil society organisations. From

2018 to 2021, 23 organisations received flexible grants that allowed them to continue operating. For example, in 2020, international donor funding to the Syrian Women's Network was withdrawn or suspended due to COVID-19, which left the organisation facing an uncertain future and unable to finance their running costs. A CSSF grant enabled the Syrian Women's Network to continue operating and to develop a strategic framework for fundraising. This project has been crucial in allowing the Syrian Women's Network, alongside other civil society organisations, to continue their critical work on engagement and empowerment of Syrian women.

In Turkey, the CSSF is funding a university-led action research project to improve the integration of Syrian girls into Turkey's education system. As well as supporting broader social cohesion between the local and refugee communities, this project addresses the specific challenges girls face such as dropouts and

Syrian girls attending a CSSF-funded project in Gaziantep, Turkey that supports access to education. Photo taken before the Covid-19 Pandemic. Credit: Bilkent University Project Team (the implementing partner).



early marriage. Data, handbooks and web-based material were developed to track and promote greater integration of Syrian girls into mainstream education and were shared with the Turkish Ministry of National Education (MoNE). These are being used to inform more refugee-friendly education policies across the country. The project has worked in collaboration with the EU-funded Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into Turkish Education System project to scale-up lessons learned from the project. CSSF work led to policy adjustments with MoNE to promote better inclusion of Syrian schoolgirls within the Turkish education system.

The CSSF Yemen programme aims for more inclusive national and local level peace processes in Yemen. For example, CSSF funding of the Senior Gender Advisor (SGA) position in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) has strengthened the Office's approaches towards gender inclusion. It increased the Office's outreach and enhanced its relationships with influential women leaders, and with local community groups and activists. The SGA developed relationships with women members of the political parties representing the internationally recognised Government of Yemen and held consultations with women members of civil society on key issues such as gender-inclusive ceasefires and community safety. Furthermore, she continued to build the skills and capacity of the Yemeni women's Technical Advisory Group, whose role is to advise the Special Envoy on gender-related issues. In addition, the SGA has also strengthened the Office's coordination with key agencies and actors by initiating monthly meetings with civil society organisations, alongside UN Women. These efforts aim to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the OSESGY's engagement on the national-level peace process.

We have also improved our internal review processes to ensure integration of gender equality in programming. To continue our efforts to improve the gender sensitivity of the CSSF, in 2021/22 we will:

- The Gender, Peace and Security portfolio, will test, pilot and innovate gender-sensitive approaches to security threats and issues prioritised within the CSSF in line with the Integrated Review, including state threats, transnational threats and climate resilience.
- Improve internal learning and development processes to ensure all teams are able to share experiences and improve their ability to deliver gender sensitive programming.

New Portfolios and Thematic Focuses

Cyber

In April 2020, the CSSF established a new Cyber portfolio. The portfolio is delivering the international elements of the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-21⁴ and the UK's cyber commitment to Commonwealth partners in our role as the Chair in Office, as well as anticipating the objectives of the government's Integrated Review and the new National Cyber Strategy (due to launch late 2021). The new portfolio draws from the Cyber Maturity Model developed and delivered by Oxford University⁵ and has evolved from the National Cyber Security Programme (2016-21), the CSSF Commonwealth Cyber Programme (2018-20), as well as the Prosperity Fund Digital Access Programme.

In 2020/21, the Cyber and Technology Security programme delivered assistance to help partner countries better protect critical national infrastructure from cyber-attacks. A new Commonwealth Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) community platform is being used by 30 countries. A project with The Shadowserver Foundation, a non-profit cyber security organisation, supported the roll out of new and additional support to African and Indo-Pacific countries. This support harvests data about malicious cyber-attacks. With this data, some 30 countries now receive free daily threat intelligence reports, enabling them to better detect and respond to cybercrime threats.

The portfolio has also engaged citizens and small and medium enterprises across 22 Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific to increase their awareness of online risks. This work reached over 17 million people by creating cyber and online safety websites in each country, delivering locally targeted publicity campaigns and training local communities on how to recognise and prevent cyber risks online. It also trained over 150 local cyber "ambassadors" who will continue to train others and raise awareness after the project has closed. Finally, the programme generated essential research and scoping into key issues and potential future programming activity that has fed into the Portfolio's design for financial year 2021/22. This included reviewing use of technology to defend,

secure and build resilience in cyberspace; researching the opportunities and challenges that digitalisation poses to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and mapping cyber and digital stakeholders in Indo-Pacific, South Asia, Africa and South America, and multilateral for a better understanding of the broad community and facilitate network building between stakeholders.

Delivery through the CSSF has enabled the portfolio to be catalytic, take mitigated risks, and adapt interventions quickly during a challenging year heavily impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021/22, the CSSF is continuing to develop and expand new programming to promote the UK's vision of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and deliver the commitment in the Integrated Review to strengthen cyber security capacity and cooperation with like-minded partners.

Climate and Biodiversity

As set out in the Integrated Review, tackling climate change and biodiversity loss is a key international priority for the UK Government. The CSSF has committed to aligning its activities with the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement as set out in the 2019 Green Finance Strategy, thereby integrating climate and environmental considerations into the Fund's operations. CSSF is also delivering programming that seeks to address instability caused when factors driving conflict, criminality and environmental degradation are combined, (referred to collectively as climate security), thereby supporting UK objectives for the environment.

The Amazon rainforest is vital to combatting climate change and protecting biodiversity but is at serious threat from deforestation. The CSSF is working to counter environmental crime, for example by funding a team of environmental experts in Colombia to develop programmes that link stabilisation work with renewable energy, sustainable cattle ranching and forest restoration efforts. These projects have leveraged funding from the Colombian national budget and the UK's International Climate Fund (ICF), highlighting the catalytic effect of the CSSF. The CSSF is working with ICF colleagues to start up a regional

4 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-strategy-2016-to-2021>

5 <https://gcsc.ox.ac.uk/cmm-reviews/>

The children of parents working on a UK-supported crop-substitution programme form a circle in Anorí, Antioquia. The project, supported by the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia, in alliance with the Colombian Government and the One Earth Future foundation, has ensured that more than 2,000 families are engaged in development activities in their communities to ensure the sustainable substitution of coca crops. Credit: www.fondonuol.org / Paso Colombia



environmental crime programme that uses data analysis to develop solutions to illegal activity across the Amazon.

During 2020/21, the CSSF made a £2 million contribution to the UN Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), an initiative to improve the UN's capacity to analyse and address the impacts of climate change on peace and security. UK support has enabled CSM to strengthen their wide range of field initiatives. These include climate-related security risk assessments, as undertaken in Somalia and Sudan. The CSSF's commitment to CSM has enhanced the UK's credibility as a leading voice on climate security issues internationally.

In 2021/22, the CSSF has continued to develop new programming on Climate and biodiversity. For example, in support of the UK's efforts to tackle the Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT), a CSSF pilot project will use digital technology to improve the quality of evidence collection at wildlife crime scenes in Botswana. Wildlife officers are being given access to a phone app (ArcGIS Survey 123) that guides them through the process of wildlife evidence collection to ensure all evidence is collected correctly. Currently, much evidence is dismissed at court because it does not meet evidential standards making it inadmissible, hindering prosecution of offenders. The app will look to improve evidence standards and assist in bringing more perpetrators of IWT to justice.

CSSF Governance

The Minister accountable to Parliament for the CSSF is the Paymaster General. The Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt MP was Paymaster General for financial year 2020/21. The Rt Hon Michael Ellis was appointed Paymaster General on 16 September 2021. The CSSF's Senior Responsible Owner is the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) David Quarrey.

Oversight and management of the CSSF is provided by the Joint Funds Unit (JFU) within the National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office. The JFU undertakes the following key functions:

- Ensuring that the Fund delivers against National Security priorities taking a whole-of-government approach;
- Ensuring programming represents value for money;
- Setting the operating framework that underpins CSSF programme design and delivery;
- Ensuring that programmes across the Fund follow government best practice and have the appropriate structures in place to actively manage risk and the funds they have been allocated to a consistently high standard.

The JFU also provides extensive advisory support to the CSSF network. This is facilitated by JFU advisors with expertise in programme management, monitoring and evaluation, gender, climate, cyber, conflict, governance and security. The support provided includes training, subject matter guidance and technical assistance. The JFU places strong emphasis on lesson-learning and sharing of best practice.

Measuring success in 2020/21

Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) helps us better deliver our programmes. Good MEL—data gathering, analysis and learning—gives CSSF the tools to ensure that the right programming decisions are taken, to demonstrate the value of our work and the impact it has, and to provide clear evidence that the intended results of CSSF programmes are delivered with value for money. MEL helps our programming adapt to address the most pressing national security challenges.

During 2020/21, the CSSF made significant progress towards building a fund-level MEL system which focused on:

- collection of evidence to enable strategic decisions on the shape and focus of portfolios;
- helping communicate to our stakeholders what our programming was delivering;
- driving the unique contribution of the CSSF to the delivery of national security priorities;
- providing a framework for a more effective approach to capturing, sharing lessons learned from previous programming for the benefits of future programming.

The CSSF's MEL system is focused on capturing evidence and learning against the following Fund-level outcomes:

- **Outcome 1, Conflict and instability:** Building resilience and stability overseas, including catalysing political settlements, in order to mitigate threats to UK national interests;
- **Outcome 2, State threats:** Strengthening resilience and responses to state threats overseas to protect UK national interests;
- **Outcome 3, Transnational threats:** Tackling transnational threats including serious and organised crime, terrorism, illicit migration and cyber-threats, to enable a more prosperous and secure UK;
- **Outcome 4, Women, peace and security:** Protecting and promoting the rights and inclusion of women and girls to advance gender equality and build sustainable peace.

The CSSF is also strengthening its evidence base through evaluation at a portfolio level. For example, the CSSF East Africa team carried out a thematic evaluation of CSSF programmes supporting conflict prevention and peacebuilding across East Africa. This provided a better understanding of how CSSF programming can most effectively link peacebuilding efforts at local and national levels. In the Middle East, CSSF teams have used a bespoke evaluation approach to capture, understand and drive better integrated delivery in Jordan. Building on these good practice examples, the JFU will focus on scaling up evaluation approaches that are most suited to capturing evidence in relevant conflict and national security programming.

Non-Discretionary Funding and the Rapid Response Mechanism

The CSSF manages some of the UK Government's non-discretionary funding. This includes the UK's assessed (mandatory) peacekeeping contributions (UN, OSCE, NATO KFOR) and Criminal Tribunals (ICC, IRMCT), as well as the net additional costs for UK troop deployments to UN Peacekeeping Missions, and the UK's bilateral contribution to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). The CSSF also funded the UK's contribution to security in Afghanistan as part of NATO's Resolute Support Mission (Op Toral) and the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP) which funds the initial costs of unforeseen military activity.

The CSSF also manages the non-ODA Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), enabling swift mobilisation of resource in times of crisis. The RRM has funded responses to the Salisbury poisonings, in Syria, during the migration crisis, as well as responding to Hurricanes Irma, Maria and Dorian. The RRM was also used to fund the initial phase of C-19 repatriation. In 2020-21, the RRM had a provision of £20m of non-ODA from within the CSSF's budget and had access to a further £20m from HMT's Special Reserve.

Preparing for the future

During 2020/21, the CSSF delivered against key government conflict, stability and security priorities as this Annual Report illustrates, adapting to maintain delivery within the constraints posed by coronavirus. The Annual Report has also highlighted the ways in which CSSF has supported the UK's international response to the pandemic, including providing rapid, front-line support in many of the most fragile and conflict affected states globally.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the UK's economy forced the government to take tough but necessary decisions on how it spends public money, including temporarily reducing the aid budget. The total allocation for CSSF in Financial Year 2021/22 is £875.61m, of which £375.48m (42.88%) is ODA and £500.13m (57.12%) is non-ODA. The Fund continues to prioritise spending on those geographies and thematic issues linked to conflict, stability and security overseas, posing the greatest direct threat to the UK and where some of the world's most vulnerable populations live.

In March 2021, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy was published, setting out the government's ambition for the UK's role in the world, including an increased commitment to security and resilience, so that the British people are protected from threats. CSSF will continue to evolve in order to ensure that it is able to a leading role as part of the UK's national security architecture.

Annex A: CSSF Financial Spend 2020/21

The final CSSF 2020/21 cross-government allocation was £1,264.8m. Total CSSF spend was £1,260.2m (99.6%). This is subject to final departmental audits.

Figure 1

Final CSSF Allocation FY 20/21	£1,264.8m
CSSF Spend FY 20/21	£1,260.2m

The total CSSF 2021/22 spend of £1,260.2m can be split by:

1. Government Department/Agency

In 2020/21 the largest spender of CSSF funding was the FCDO, in large part, due to the Peacekeeping contributions (£376.6m).

Final spend on Departmental Baselines was: Cabinet Office (CO) 101%, Ministry of Defence (MOD) 100%, HM Treasury (HMT) 100%, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 100%, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 100%, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) 100%, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 97%, Home Office (HO) 96%, National Crime Agency (NCA) 94%, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 90%, Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) 89%, Department for Transport (DFT) 83%, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 78%, UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) 59%.

Figure 2—CSSF Spend by government department for Financial Year 2020/21

Department	£m
FCDO	£925.96
MOD	£238.39
HO	£34.07
HMT	£34.00
NCA	£8.93
CO	£7.68
DEFRA	£3.91
DFT	£3.73
DHSC	£1.54
HMRC	£0.77
BEIS	£0.58
MOJ	£0.35

Department	£m
CPS	£0.26

Figure 3—Proportion of 2020/21 CSSF Spend by Government Department

Department	%
FCDO	73.48%
MOD	18.92%
HO	2.70%
HMT	2.70%
NCA	0.71%
CO	0.61%
DEFRA	0.31%
DFT	0.30%
DHSC	0.12%
HMRC	0.06%
BEIS	0.05%
MOJ	0.03%
CPS	0.02%

2. Regional and Thematic Spend

Corporate Delivery Support includes the Joint Funds Unit (JFU), Stabilisation Unit (SU) and Global Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (GMEL), allocated as follows:

- Stabilisation Unit: £12.16m
- JFU: £4m
- GMEL: £4m

Figure 4—2020/21 CSSF Spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme.

Theme	£m
Peacekeeping	376.62
MOD Ringfences	193.43
Middle East and North Africa	165.33
South Asia	90.47
Sub-Saharan Africa	87.19
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	80.33
Overseas Territories	62.06
Western Balkans	54.09
Multilateral Strategy	32.54

Theme	£m
Counter Terrorism Programme Fund	32.48
Corporate Delivery Support	20.57
Serious and Organised Crime	19.61
Americas	15.79
Asia Pacific	9.68
Migration	6.48
Cyber	5.29
Gender Peace and Security	4.7
National Security Communications	3.51
Turkey	0.02

Figure 5—Proportion of 2020/21 CSSF spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme.

Theme	%
Peacekeeping	29.89%
MOD Ringfences	15.35%
Middle East and North Africa	13.12%
South Asia	7.18%
Sub-Saharan Africa	6.92%
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	6.37%
Overseas Territories	4.92%
Western Balkans	4.29%
Multilateral Strategy	2.58%
Counter Terrorism Programme Fund	2.58%
Corporate Delivery Support	1.63%
Serious and Organised Crime	1.56%
Americas	1.25%
Asia Pacific	0.77%
Migration	0.51%
Cyber	0.42%
Gender Peace and Security	0.37%
National Security Communications	0.28%
Turkey	0%

3. ODA/Non-ODA

The 2020/21 total spend was split by £610.3m (48.4%) of ODA and £649.9m (51.6%) of non-ODA.

A breakdown of calendar year 2020 CSSF ODA spend by Department can be found in the Statistics on International Development report published on Gov.UK.⁶

Figure 7—Total CSSF 2020/21 ODA Spend—£610.3m by region, cross-regional, and non-discretionary theme.

Theme	£m
Middle East and North Africa	150.117
Peacekeeping	90.37
South Asia	80.394
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	57.273
Sub-Saharan Africa	55.358
Western Balkans	50.413
Multilateral Strategy	29.149
Counter Terrorism Programme Fund	20.856
Corporate Delivery Support	20.505
Americas	15.75
Asia Pacific	9.091
Serious and Organised Crime	7.747
Overseas Territories	6.916
Migration	6.477
Cyber	4.7
Gender Peace and Security	4.7
National Security Communications	0.5
Turkey	0.017

6 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-on-international-development>

Official Development Assistance

ODA—48.4% Non-ODA—51.6%

CSSF achieved 68% spend against the 68% ODA spending target by 31 December 2020. This contributed to the UK's commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid.

The top 5 recipients of ODA were:

1. Afghanistan	£55.3m
2. Lebanon	£24.4m
3. Occupied Palestinian Territories	£21.6m
4. Iraq	£18.4m
5. Pakistan	£16.7m

Non-ODA

The top 5 geographical recipients of non-ODA were:

1. Overseas Territories	£55.1m
2. Somalia	£16.5m
3. Nigeria	£9.3m
4. Afghanistan	£9.1m
5. Lebanon	£7.9m

When combined with MOD ringfences of £193.4m and Peacekeeping non-ODA £286.3m, this accounts for approximately 95% of total non-ODA spend.

Figure 8: Total CSSF 2020/21 Non-ODA Spend—by region, cross-regional and non-discretionary theme.

Theme	£m
Peacekeeping	286.25
MOD Ringfences	193.432
Overseas Territories	55.143
Sub-Saharan Africa	31.834
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	23.054
Middle East and North Africa	15.243
Serious and Organised Crime	11.862
Counter Terrorism Programme Fund	11.622
South Asia	10.08
Western Balkans	3.674
Multilateral Strategy	3.386
National Security Communications	3.006
Cyber	0.594
Asia Pacific	0.591
Corporate Delivery Support	0.055
Americas	0.044

4. Discretionary/Non-Discretionary

Conditions were applied to the 2015 Spending Review settlement which are treated as non-discretionary spend. These included continued funding of peacekeeping activities, the Deployed Military Activity Pool (DMAP) and military operations in Afghanistan (Op Toral). In addition to the above ringfences, non-discretionary spend also included the UK's troop deployments to UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus and Mali.

Of the total CSSF 2020/21 spend of £1260.2m, £570m (45%) was non-discretionary. This included:

- Assessed Peacekeeping contributions (£376.6m);
- Operational funds for the MOD (£193.4m)

A breakdown of these figures is included in Annex C. The remaining CSSF spend was discretionary programme (55%). Of this, the majority was ODA (77%).

Annex B: CSSF non-discretionary spend breakdown

UN Peacekeeping and Other Multilateral Contributions	Spend (£m)	ODA (£m)	Non-ODA (£m)
United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	£48.5	£7.6	£40.9
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	£54.9	£8.3	£46.6
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	£55.4	£8.1	£47.3
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Centra Africa Republic (MINUSCA)	£41.2	£5.9	£35.3
United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	£21.2	£3.0	£18.2
United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)	£24.7	£0.0	£24.7
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	£22.1	£3.2	£18.9
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	£12.0	£1.7	£10.3
United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)	£0.0	£0.0	£0.0
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	£2.9	£0.0	£2.9
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	£2.6	£0.4	£2.2
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	£1.7	£0.2	£1.5
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	£1.2	£0.0	£1.2
UN Peacekeeping Credits	-£3.9	£0.0	-£3.9
UN Special Political Missions	£26.0	£11.8	£14.2
UN Tribunals	£3.2	£0.0	£3.2
International Criminal Court	£10.8	£0.0	£10.8
EU Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy Missions	£34.0	£27.5	£6.5
EU Military Common Security and Defence Policy Missions	£8.9	£0.0	£8.9
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Field Missions	£16.7	£12.6	£4.1
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	£1.7	£0.0	£1.7
Foreign Exchange Adjustment (gains and losses on advance purchase of foreign currency)	-£9.5	£0.0	-£9.5
Admin Fees	£0.1	£0.0	£0.1
TOTAL	£376.6	£90.3	£286.2
MOD Operational Spend	£m		
Deployed Military Activity Pool	£50.00		
Operation TORAL—Afghanistan	£102.26		
Operation NEWCOMBE—Mali	£21.03		
Operation TOSCA—Cyprus	£20.14		
Total (100% non-ODA)	£193.43		

Annex C: CSSF Governance—Additional Information

Budget allocations

The majority of the CSSF's programmes are multi-year, although the CSSF reviews its spending through an annual budget allocation 're-profiling' process. HM Treasury commissions a comprehensive review of the CSSF each year to ensure that funds are allocated to the highest strategic priorities and deliver value for money.

In 2020/21, alongside all ODA spending departments, the JFU oversaw an ODA re-prioritisation exercise to identify changes to the CSSF's ODA budget. Programme teams had to demonstrate that their programmes aligned with the UK's top national security objectives, had the capacity to deliver results, and complied with CSSF programme management standards.

JFU technical and programme management experts assessed the bids, which were then moderated across the CSSF portfolio. The outcome of this exercise was shared with the DNSA who challenged all Portfolio leads to examine their programmes and ensure that their portfolios reflected current National Security Council priorities and were able to flex to respond to emerging opportunities and evolving political direction. Final approval was then sought from members of the National Security Council for CSSF portfolio allocations.

Allocations were awarded to Portfolio Boards, with individual departments accountable for the funding on their departmental baselines. Portfolio Boards report quarterly to the JFU on spend, highlighting any risks, concerns and lessons learned on programme or country performance.

During the year, portfolio teams shifted funding between programmes where the operating context changed rapidly in year, where programmes were performing particularly well and could achieve more with additional funding, or where there was a substantial change to the UK's strategic objectives.

Programme design, delivery and oversight.

In order to progress from design to delivery, every CSSF programme must secure appropriate approval

in line with CSSF and departmental levels of delegated authority through:

- A Programme Document: This sets out why the UK is engaging, what strategic objectives the programme supports, what the programme will deliver and how, including commercial procurement plans and monitoring and evaluation arrangements, and the resources needed. Summaries of these documents are published on GOV.uk⁷.
- Programme Results Frameworks and Risk Registers: These set out exactly what a programme expects to deliver, what results it will contribute to and by when, and the risks Senior Responsible Owners will monitor and seek to mitigate.
- Programmes are organised into geographic or thematic Portfolios which must demonstrate that they align to the government's strategic priorities.
- Each Portfolio is overseen by a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). Portfolio SROs are accountable to the DNSA for their portfolio's impact, risk management and financial performance. All spend must also comply with departmental guidance and each portfolio SRO is responsible for ensuring that the respective processes are adhered to.
- Overseas CSSF programmes are overseen by a senior official in the respective diplomatic mission. These local SROs are responsible for delivery, spend, and local risk and escalating to the relevant Portfolio SRO when required.

During their lifetime, all CSSF programmes are subject to Annual Reviews, which assess the extent to which the programme has realised its ambitions and delivered results in any given year. The reviews also look at how programme teams manage commercial partnerships, their budgets and deliver value for money, as well as considering how the teams have assessed risk, conflict sensitivity, gender sensitivity and changing contexts. Summaries of the annual reviews are published on Gov.UK⁸. Increasingly, programmes also undertake additional third-party monitoring and evaluation.

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries>

⁸ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programmes-annual-reviews>

Working in high-risk environments

The CSSF works in challenging operating environments, which requires the Fund—and the UK Government—to maintain a high-risk appetite. CSSF teams are required to identify, monitor and, as far as possible, mitigate the risks associated with their programmes to ensure they do no harm and represent value for money. They must also consider how risks might differ for groups defined by any of the protected characteristics as well as our staff implementing the programmes. Portfolio Boards are required to review programme and portfolio risks on an ongoing basis, noting any residual risk remaining after mitigating actions have been taken.

Decisions about how much risk is tolerable within different parts of the CSSF portfolio are delegated to Portfolio Boards and are based on the context, strategic priority, value and potential positive impact of programmes. Where residual risk in a programme or portfolio remains very high, risk management decisions are escalated to Ministers.

For all security and justice programmes, Overseas Security and Justice Assessments (OSJAs) represent an additional risk management process to assess human rights risks, identify any mitigating actions and outline any residual risk. Portfolio Boards and programme teams in country are responsible for ensuring that OSJAs are in place for relevant programmes before activities start. They should be reviewed at least annually, for extensions or changes to programme design and delivery, and when there has been a substantial change in the circumstances where a programme is operating. OSJAs and their reviews can result in activity being redesigned, paused or stopped, for example, where environments have changed to such an extent that the identified risk threshold has been exceeded.



HM Government

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
King Charles Street,
London
SW1A 2AH

© Crown copyright 2021

Any enquiries regarding this publication should be
sent to us at NSSJointProgrammeHub@fcdo.gov.uk