

THE HIDDEN CONTRADICTIONS OF OPERATION TALLA

Edition 1 Release - Forensic Red-Flag Analysis

(Source temporarily withheld - further disclosures coming up soon in Edition 2)

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This preliminary release sets out a series of red-flags arising from senior-level admissions concerning Operation Talla and the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC). These findings arise from statements attributed to the then Chair of the NPCC, Martin Hewitt, whose own descriptions now raise profound questions about the accuracy, honesty and legality of what the public, Parliament and multiple police forces were subsequently told.

This Edition deliberately refrains from revealing the source material, which will follow in Edition 2.

1. The NPCC's "Non-Operational Body" Claim Has Collapsed

According to statements made by Martin Hewitt himself, Operation Talla was run as a UK-wide police response with the NPCC Chair taking the Gold Commander role and pulling all chief constables together under a central direction.

This alone flatly contradicts:

- later NPCC FOI responses claiming "Operation Talla was not a command structure",
- assertions that the NPCC played no operational function, and
- claims that forces independently determined how to police Covid matters.

If Hewitt's own account is accurate, then multiple later statements made by the NPCC are demonstrably false.

2. A UK-Wide Command Structure Quietly Denied in Public

Hewitt appears to have confirmed that:

- Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales operated as a single integrated policing response,
- with NPCC guidance being near-identical across all four nations,
- and only superficial local variation.

However, when vaccine-related crime reports were later rejected in Scotland, the official explanation was:

- “local decision-making”,

- “no national advice”,
- “no NPCC involvement”.

This cannot be reconciled with Hewitt’s own admissions.

If the NPCC truly coordinated a UK-wide response, then:

- the rejection of vaccine-harm reports cannot have been an isolated, local anomaly, and
- any suggestion of independent force-level autonomy becomes highly suspect.

3. Hewitt Admits Daily Contact With Ministers

According to Hewitt’s description of his role:

- he was in daily contact with the Home Secretary,
- working hand-in-glove with the central government response teams,

- and closely engaged with DHSC data and decision-making.

If so, it is essentially impossible that he was unaware of:

- widespread public concerns regarding vaccine injury,
- high-profile crime reports alleging serious offences,
- and the shutting down of CRN 6029679/21 without investigation.

Yet none of this appeared in his public-facing narrative.

That silence now functionally amounts to misrepresentation by omission, particularly given the seriousness of the allegations.

4. Hewitt's Statements Imply a Centralised Rejection Policy - Even Though the NPCC Denies It Exists

The later-disclosed Police Scotland directive (issued on “advice of NPCC and UK Gold Command”) is entirely

consistent with Hewitt's portrayal of a national command structure.

It is inconsistent with all NPCC denials.

If Martin Hewitt's account is accurate, then:

- The NPCC did give operational direction.
- Gold Command did influence investigative decision-making.
- A UK-wide suppression policy is the only explanation that fits all known facts.

The only remaining question is how far up the chain this policy extended.

5. Hewitt Publicly Celebrates Transparency - Except Where It Matters

He emphasised transparency in issuing lockdown statistics, Fixed Penalty Notices, public briefings and disproportionality analysis.

But where transparency would have mattered most:

- evidence rejection,
- crime-number refusal,
- vaccine-harm allegations,
- Covid Inquiry relevance,
- and internal directives...

...there was complete silence.

This selective transparency is itself a major indicator of bad faith.

6. Hewitt's Description of Centralised "Operational Guidance" Exposes Another Major Contradiction

Hewitt stated that the NPCC:

- produced short operational leaflets for all frontline officers,

- in order to ensure national consistency,
- because local interpretation was considered too variable.

This is functionally indistinguishable from operational command.

The NPCC however, continues to claim:

- no operational role,
- no national instructions,
- no involvement in decisions to refuse vaccine reports.

The contradictions are now impossible to ignore.

7. The “Four Es” Policing Model Is Incompatible With How Vaccine Crime Reports Were Handled

Hewitt praises:

- Engage, Explain, Encourage, Enforce,

- policing by consent,
- proportionality.

But where the alleged offences related to vaccines, involving possible homicide, fraud, misconduct, or regulatory breaches, the police approach instead became:

- Reject,
- Deflect,
- Suppress,
- Deny.

This two-tiered policing model is indefensible.

8. Hewitt's Own Account Supports the Existence of the Hidden System We Have Now Uncovered

Without yet disclosing our source, it appears the former NPCC Chair has inadvertently confirmed:

- central command structures,
- national consistency,

- and Gold Command involvement.

When set against:

- Speirs' directive,
- NPCC FOI denials,
- CRN 6029679/21,
- and testimony from whistleblowers and victims across the UK...

...the inescapable conclusion is this:

There was a covert, UK-wide suppression system for politically sensitive reports and it operated under the umbrella of Operation Talla.

Conclusion - Edition 1

This first edition sets out the structural contradictions and internal red flags now identified.

They arise directly from statements made by one of the most senior police figures in Britain during the Covid period.

Edition 2 will reveal the source material and demonstrate how each red flag arises from Hewitt's own words.

For now, NPCC ought to ask itself a very uncomfortable question:

“How much more does Ethical Approach UK already know?”