

# **INVESTIGATIVE ANALYSIS REPORT**

## **Operation Talla, NPCC Chiefs' Council Minutes (12 January 2022) and CRN 6029679/21**

### **1. Executive Summary**

This report provides a detailed forensic analysis of the NPCC Chiefs' Council Minutes dated 12 January 2022 (created 14 January 2022) and identifies their evidential significance in relation to the Metropolitan Police Service Crime Reference Number 6029679/21, the operational structure and conduct of Operation Talla, the emergence of the "to not record" approach and the Speirs Directive issued on 25 January 2022.

The document constitutes direct evidence of national-level policing coordination at the highest operational tier.

It demonstrates that a single crime report made to the Metropolitan Police Service was escalated beyond local handling and became the subject of national strategic consideration across all Chief Constables.

That report was subjected to centralised assessment, the outcome of which was intended to produce a "clearer steer" capable of being communicated to all police forces nationally.

The same material was also passed to a government anti-covid misinformation group, thereby introducing non-policing actors into the handling pathway of what was, in form, a criminal allegation.

The matter was further recorded as requiring peer review and dissemination across all forces.

When placed within the established evidential timeline, the document provides compelling linkage evidence that Crime Reference Number 6029679/21 functioned as a national trigger event in the formulation of Operation Talla response policy, including the subsequent adoption of non-recording practices and rejection protocols.

## **2. Source Document**

The source document is the NPCC Chiefs' Council Minutes for 12 January 2022, bearing the security classification "OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE."

## **3. Verbatim Extracts Relevant to Operation Talla and CRN Context**

The following passages are extracted verbatim and form the evidential core of this analysis.

The first passage states:

*“Most forces received a letter from an anti-vax group before Christmas. A crime report was made to the Met and the final assessment should be complete next week when a clearer steer can be communicated. Some forces have been asked for an update on actions they are taking by a variety of people, and it looks as if some groups are connecting to promote their agenda. This is all being passed to the government anti covid misinformation group so themes can be identified and options explored.”*

The second passage states:

*“Op Talla team to share the results of the peer review assessment relating to the Crime Report submitted to the Met Police in relation to Anti-Vaccinations with all chiefs.”*

#### **4. Forensic Contextualisation**

The minutes refer to “a crime report... made to the Met.” This reference must be analysed in light of the known evidential framework surrounding Crime Reference Number 6029679/21. That crime report was submitted to the Metropolitan Police Service in December 2021, allocated a formal crime reference number and subsequently subject to internal handling processes, including recategorisation and internal communications which has been properly evidenced.

The language used within the minutes demonstrates that the crime report in question was not treated as a localised or routine complaint. Instead, it was elevated to national awareness, subjected to structured assessment and positioned as the basis for a coordinated response across all forces. The phrase “*a clearer steer can be communicated*” is of particular operational significance. It indicates that a national directive was in development, derived from the assessment of a single report and intended for dissemination across all policing bodies.

This transforms the character of the report from an evidential submission requiring investigation into a policy-generating event within a national command environment.

## **5. National Elevation of CRN 6029679/21**

The meeting at which this discussion occurred included all Chief Constables across the United Kingdom, senior Metropolitan Police leadership and national operational leads, including Assistant Chief Constable Owen Weatherill of the National Police Coordination Centre.

The inclusion of such personnel confirms that the subject matter of the crime report had been elevated to the highest level of policing governance.

The progression evident within the minutes is clear and sequential.

A crime report is submitted. That report becomes known nationally.

It is subjected to centralised assessment.

A national “*steer*” is anticipated.

The outcome is to be disseminated across all forces.

This progression is not consistent with ordinary investigative handling.

It is consistent with the derivation of policy from a criminal allegation.

## **6. External Influence and Government Involvement**

The document expressly states that the material arising from the report is being passed to “*the government anti covid misinformation group.*”

This introduces a significant constitutional and legal dimension.

The handling of a crime report is no longer confined to policing structures or evidential assessment processes. Instead, it is integrated into a governmental framework concerned with messaging, behavioural analysis and narrative control.

The functional effect of this is to alter the categorisation of the underlying material.

A report which begins as an allegation of criminal conduct is repositioned within a framework concerned with “misinformation” and thematic analysis.

This constitutes a recharacterisation of evidential material and is directly relevant to subsequent non-recording and rejection practices.

## **7. The “Steer” as a Precursor to Non-Recording Practices**

The reference to a forthcoming “steer” must be read in conjunction with subsequent NPCC disclosures referring to “*the guidance to not record*” and the Speirs Directive issued on 25 January 2022.

The temporal proximity is critical. The meeting took place on 12 January 2022. The Speirs Directive followed thirteen days later. Within that interval, the assessment of the crime report was to be completed and a “steer” communicated.

This sequence establishes a logical continuity. A nationally significant report is assessed. A coordinated response is formulated. A directive emerges shortly thereafter.

The evidential weight of this sequence supports the inference that the “steer” referenced in the minutes is

functionally connected to the subsequent adoption of non-recording practices.

## **8. Linkage to the Speirs Directive**

The Speirs Directive instructed Police Scotland to reject COVID-19 vaccine-related reports and explicitly stated that it was issued on the advice of the National Police Chiefs' Council and UK Gold Command under Operation Talla.

The structural alignment between the minutes and the Directive is clear.

The minutes demonstrate that the NPCC and Operation Talla structures were actively engaged in centralised decision-making and the generation of national guidance.

The functional alignment is equally clear. Both the minutes and the Directive address vaccine-related reporting, operate at a national coordination level and result in uniform handling across forces.

Accordingly, the minutes provide pre-decisional evidence of the policy environment from which the Speirs Directive emerged.

## **9. Linkage to the “*to not record*” Approach**

NPCC disclosures confirm that *“the guidance to not record has been a success.”*

The minutes provide the contextual bridge necessary to understand how such guidance emerged.

They demonstrate that policing leadership was centrally concerned with the volume and coordination of reports, that there was an intention to identify themes across forces and that a national *“steer”* was to be issued. The involvement of the government misinformation group further indicates a reframing of the reports themselves.

The progression is therefore coherent and evidentially supported.

Reports are received at scale. They are centrally assessed. They are reframed within a misinformation context. A national directive is formulated. Non-recording and rejection practices are adopted.

The document therefore evidences the decision-making phase immediately preceding the systematic non-recording of relevant allegations.

## **10. Operation Talla as a Command Structure**

The minutes demonstrate that Operation Talla operated through the NPCC Chiefs’ Council and involved all UK forces. It produced coordinated updates, national actions and structured dissemination pathways.

It also engaged with external partners and government bodies.

These features are characteristic of a command structure rather than a purely informational or advisory framework.

The presence of centralised updates, coordinated logistics, formal action tracking and national dissemination confirms that Operation Talla functioned as a de facto national command mechanism.

## **11. Overall Forensic Conclusions**

The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the crime report associated with CRN 6029679/21 was escalated nationally, treated as strategically significant and used to inform national policy development.

The document demonstrates that Operation Talla operated as a centralised coordination and decision-making structure with the capacity to generate national guidance and integrate with government systems.

There is a clear evidential pathway linking the crime report to the emergence of non-recording practices.

The minutes capture the stage at which the report was being assessed and a national “*steer*” was being formulated.

Within days, this is followed by the Speirs Directive and the broader adoption of rejection and non-recording policies.

The document therefore provides precursor evidence of the decision-making environment which gave rise to those policies.

## **12. Final Evidential Position**

On a balanced and rigorous forensic assessment, the contents of these minutes materially support the conclusion that a nationally significant crime report, namely CRN 6029679/21, was escalated through Operation Talla structures, subjected to centralised assessment involving both policing and government actors and used as a basis for developing nationally coordinated guidance which, within a short and proximate timeframe, manifested as the Speirs Directive and the broader “*to not record*” operational approach.

***Ian Clayton***

***6 April 2026***

**Note:** A copy of the relevant meeting minutes may be examined below.



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<b>Author and Contributors:</b>	Mark Farey
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	14 January 2022
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	NPCC Central Office
<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	N/A
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**Chief Constables' Council Minutes**

12 January 2022

**Attendees**

- |                    |                         |
|--------------------|-------------------------|
| CC Michelle Skeer  | Cumbria – Meeting Chair |
| T/DCC Nikki Watson | Avon and Somerset       |
| CC Garry Forsyth   | Bedfordshire            |
| CC Nick Dean       | Cambridgeshire          |
| CC Mark Roberts    | Cheshire                |

Cmsr Angela McLaren	City of London
DCC Helen McMillan	Cleveland
CC Rachel Swann	Derbyshire Constabulary
CC Shaun Sawyer	Devon and Cornwall
CC Jo Farrell	Durham
CC Richard Lewis	Dyfed-Powys
CC Ben-Julian Harrington	Essex
CC Rod Hansen	Gloucestershire
CC Stephen Watson	Greater Manchester
CC Pam Kelly	Gwent
CC Olivia Pinkney	Hampshire
CC Charlie Hall	Hertfordshire
CC Lee Freeman	Humberside
CC Chris Rowley	Lancashire
CC Simon Cole	Leicestershire
T/ACC Chris Davison	Lincolnshire
CC Serena Kennedy	Merseyside
Dep Cmsr Sir Stephen House	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Helen Ball	Metropolitan Police Service
DAC Amanda Pearson	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Louisa Rolfe	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Matt Jukes	Metropolitan Police Service
CC Andy Adams	Ministry of Defence Police
CC Carl Foulkes	North Wales
CC Paul Sanford	Norfolk Constabulary
DCC Simon Nickless	Northamptonshire
CC Craig Guildford	Nottinghamshire
CC Winton Keenan	Northumbria
DCC Mabs Hussain	North Yorkshire
CC Iain Livingstone	Police Scotland
CC James Vaughan	South Wales
T/CC Lauren Poultney	South Yorkshire
CC Chris Noble	Staffordshire
CC Stephen Jupp	Suffolk
CC Gavin Stephens	Surrey
CC Jo Shiner	Sussex
CC Debra Tedds	Warwickshire
CC Pippa Mills	West Mercia
CC Sir David Thompson	West Midlands
CC John Robins	West Yorkshire
CC Kier Pritchard	Wiltshire
DCC Alistair Sutherland	British Transport Police

CC Simon Chesterman  
CEO Andy Marsh

\*\*S23\*\*

Col Mark John  
CO Ruari Hardy  
CO Robin Smith  
A/DCC Stewart Gull  
CO Gary Roberts  
Cmsr Richard Ullger

**In attendance**

ACC Owen Weatherill  
AC Robert Beckley  
DCC Janette McCormick  
Robin Wilkinson  
Gemma Stannard  
Angela Connolly  
T/Ch Insp Wayne Nash  
Richard Hampson  
Cathy Willis  
Mark Farey  
David Paul  
John Bragaglia  
Fi Greenlees

\*\*S23\*\*

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Nicola Growcott

Civil Nuclear Constabulary  
College of Policing

\*\*S23\*\*

Royal Military Police  
Guernsey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
Isle of Man Police  
Royal Gibraltar Police

NPoCC  
Assistant Commissioner – Op Resolve  
Operation Uplift  
Metropolitan Police Service  
NPCC Strategic Hub Lead  
NPCC Business Support Lead  
NPCC Staff Officer  
NPCC Senior Business Officer  
NPCC Executive Assistant  
NPCC Business Support  
NPCC Workforce Committee Support  
NPCC SOC Portfolio Director/National ROCU Coordinator  
NPCC FOIA  
\*\*S23\*\* CO  
\*\*S23\*\* Director  
\*\*S23\*\* SRO  
\*\*S23\*\*  
NPCC Head of Communications

**SESSION 1:**

**NPCC Chair's Update**

The Chair welcomed those present to this virtual Chiefs' Council meeting. The following tendered their apologies for the meeting.

AC Martin Hewitt – NPCC Chair  
Chief Constable Nick Adderley – Northamptonshire Police  
Chief Constable Sarah Crew – Avon and Somerset Constabulary  
Chief Constable Alan Pughsley – Kent Police

## **Op Talla Covid-19 Update**

The latest absence rate is 8.6% which has decreased from previous week rate of 9.5% which is first fall in a month. There is disparity in absence rates across the county with 18 forces still over 10% but while this is uncomfortable none are reporting a critical issue at this stage.

There is still an issue with LFT supply and Dr Jenny Harries has written to all LAs and LRF chairs reminding them to share available existing stocks with emergency services. An additional 12,000 LFTs will be distributed to forces and targeted at Control Rooms with rationale being to avoid the difficulty of having to backfill that function. This will provide 5 weeks supply for each staff member. The distribution to forces will be based on numbers returned recently, and it is expected to take place week commencing 17 January.

There is no change on testing regulations at present.

The second tranche of the Disproportionality Report for Fixed Penalty Notices has now been completed. The University of Edinburgh will distribute this to forces next week for quality assurance, after this it will need to be peer reviewed. As there is not a clamour for the report at present there will probably not be publication until the third tranche is completed. This should be much faster than previous tranches and then reporting will cover the period to summer of 2020 which is where the bulk of enforcement took place. This would give a fuller picture of the enforcement activity rather than just releasing the report on the second tranche.

Most forces received a letter from an anti-vax group before Christmas. A crime report was made to the Met and the final assessment should be complete next week when a clearer steer can be communicated. Some forces have been asked for an update on actions they are taking by a variety of people, and it looks as if some groups are connecting to promote their agenda. This is all being passed to the government anti covid misinformation group so themes can be identified and options explored. To help with this a request for information was sent by AMA group to all forces and responses would be appreciated.

## **Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan**

Recent meeting with the Policing Minister focused more on Homicide Prevention than the Beating Crime Plan. The Minister has a strong interest in how police can use data to predict where homicides are likely to take place. While this focus is welcome the need to work with other partner agencies must also be highlighted. Data should be collected on what is required from partners in order to have better outcomes – e.g. education, housing etc.

A national homicide suppression strategy needs to be developed along with partner agencies. Data such as markers for knife crime and data from child services should be used to identify those at risk. For example recent data on teen murder and exclusion from school shows that 60% had been excluded from school. Up to 85% of young people murdered are BAME and in conjunction with other high risk indicators (50% had previous CJS contact) a cohort of young men can be identified,

the most appropriate interventions should be identified – whether this be police focus or other partner agencies taking lead.

Concerns about Domestic abuse act were also raised – levels of domestic homicide have not decreased in line with other types. There is a need to be very clear about evidence and data and how it may be used as a predictor for crimes. Greatest opportunities are with education, housing and health for reduction and prevention of crime rather than with the police.

Ten forces are to build a small hub with CoP access. This would collect data and look at perpetrator and victim profiles. This will help to identify which interactions with other agencies would be best to focus on. Noted that not all areas can have the same models, what works for Thames Valley may not be the best sustainable option for London or West Midlands.

### **Op Talla – Covid-19 Update**

**1.1 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

**1.2 Action:** Op Talla team to share the work created in conjunction with Edinburgh University around disproportionately of fixed penalty notices to chiefs for quality assurance.

**1.3 Action:** Op Talla team to share the results of the peer review assessment relating to the Crime Report submitted to the Met Police in relation to Anti-Vaccinations with all chiefs.

### **Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan Update**

**1.4 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

**1.5 Action:** Homicide prevention to be included in the agenda during crime session at February CCC.

**1.6 Action:** Beating crime plan following the systems leaders meeting to be included in the agenda during the Performance Management session at the March CCC. The Policing Minister will be invited to attend the March meeting to discuss.

### **SESSION 2:**

#### **NPCC Pay and Conditions Update**

**\*\*S31\*\***

### **SESSION 3:**

#### **Inclusion and Race Programme**

Reminder that full and frank discussions are best supported if Chatham House rules are observed.

Draft of introduction to plan has been circulated and it is acknowledged that this a difficult discussion and there are a range of opinions over the most appropriate language to use, although all

agree that it is important that actions are seen to be taken. It may be difficult to build consensus across policing and different communities on the best phrasing to use, however a consistent position should be agreed as this is an issue which needs to be addressed.

The label of Institutional Racism could be seen as unhelpful and there are concerns as to what the media reaction and impact on staff morale would be. It is recognised that Chiefs Constables are not a diverse group and it was decided to bring Black voices in to hear from those with lived experience, and they do believe police are institutionally racist.

It was suggested that it may be worth investigating how other public sector organisations, such as NHS, have defined issues along with the wider societal and historical context. The actions already taken and progress made should be highlighted in the plan.

### **Inclusion and Race Programme Plan Discussion**

**3.1 Decisions:** Chiefs agreed to provide feedback and proposed alternative wording to the proposed foreword (statement) within ten days, for incorporation into the revised plan in time for the February Chiefs' Council meeting.

**3.2 Action:** NPCC Comms to provide a form of words following the outcome of the Race & inclusion discussion.

#### **SESSION 4:**

**\*\*S23\*\***

#### **SESSION 5:**

### **SOC PUP Uplift and Forward Plan**

**\*\*S31 & S24\*\***

**5.1 Decision:** Chiefs' endorsed the proposals and direction of travel set out in the paper including:

- NPCC SOC Portfolio will commence work with NPCC Portfolio leads, regional SOC Chief Officer leads and partners on the 23/24 allocation, as soon as the full funding settlement is known.

• **\*\*S23\*\***

- Aim to complete the document before the end of the financial year, subject to confirmation of funding settlements. **\*\*S23\*\*** Document will be

signed off by NPCC SOC Programme Board and National Crime Coordination Committee, before being submitted to the Home Office.

- When agreed, implementation will be overseen by National ROCU Executive Board, comprising regional SOC Chief Officer leads and partners.